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THE ACCOMMODATION OF LAST RESORT: 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
AND REASSIGNMENTS 
Abstract: In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) to eliminate widespread discrimination against disabled persons. The 
Act requires private employers to provide reasonable accommodations to disa-
bled employees to allow them to continue performing essential job functions. 
One accommodation in particular has divided the U.S. Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals: reassigning disabled employees to vacant positions. Due to a current cir-
cuit split, it is unclear if employers must reassign disabled employees despite 
maintaining policies of choosing the best-qualified employees for reassignment. 
This Note argues that both the text of the ADA and the ADA’s legislative history 
support automatic reassignments when no other reasonable accommodations al-
low a disabled employee to perform his or her essential job functions. Although 
reassignments pose several unique concerns, they are adequately addressed 
through existing statutory safeguards and U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission regulations. Noncompetitive reassignments should be given teeth 
either through a congressional amendment or through future court cases. 
Congress [has] acknowledged that society’s accumulated myths and fears 
about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limi-
tations that flow from actual impairment. 
—Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Pam Huber, a dry grocery order filler employed at Wal-Mart’s Clarks-
ville, Arkansas distribution center, permanently injured her right arm and 
hand.2 Because Huber could no longer perform the essential functions of a 
dry grocery order filler, she sought reassignment to a vacant router position.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). 
 2 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Huber I), No. 04-2145, 2005 WL 3690679, at *1 (W.D. Ark. 
Dec. 7, 2005), rev’d, Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Huber II), 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007). An 
order filler is an employee charged with packaging and shipping goods to customers in response to 
their orders. Order Filler Job Description, AMERICA’S JOB EXCHANGE: JOBS FOR EVERYONE, 
http://www.americasjobexchange.com/order-filler-job-description, archived at http://perma.cc/3VCH-
AXHS (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
 3 Huber I, 2005 WL 3690679, at *1. Although it is unclear what the router position entailed, 
the parties agreed that the position was equivalent to the dry grocery order filler position and was 
neither a promotion nor demotion. See id. 
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Both the dry grocery order filler position and the router position paid approx-
imately $13.00 an hour.4 At the time, Wal-Mart maintained a policy of award-
ing each reassignment to the most qualified candidate who applied for the 
reassignment, commonly referred to as a “best-qualified reassignment poli-
cy.”5 Under this policy, Huber was required to compete with nondisabled 
employees who also sought the router position.6 Wal-Mart eventually filled 
the router position with a nondisabled employee who was more qualified than 
Huber.7 Huber was then reassigned to a janitorial position at a different loca-
tion that only paid $6.20 an hour.8 
In 2010, an estimated 56.7 million Americans, like Pam Huber, suffered 
from disabilities.9 Numerous polls and statistics repeatedly demonstrate that 
disabled Americans experience high levels of unemployment and earn less 
income than nondisabled Americans.10 In an effort to address the economic 
problems of the disabled community Congress enacted the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”).11 Under certain circumstances the ADA requires, 
among other things, that employers reassign disabled employees to vacant 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. Merit based best-qualified reassignment policies are distinguishable from seniority sys-
tems, which are based on the amount of time an employee has worked for his or her employer. See 
EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 
(2013) (recognizing that a best-qualified reassignment policy is not equivalent to a seniority sys-
tem). 
 6 Huber I, 2005 WL 3690679, at *1. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at *2. 
 9 MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010, at 4 
(2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/FX9C-PW65 [hereinafter AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010]. 
 10 See, e.g., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010, supra note 9, at 10 (reporting that 41.1% 
of disabled individuals between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-four were employed whereas 
79.1% of nondisabled individuals in the same age range were employed); Economic News Re-
lease, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Persons with a Disability: Labor Force 
Characteristics Summary (June 11, 2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/disabl.
nr0.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/PKG2-NSVZ (reporting that, in 2013, 17.6% of disabled 
people were employed while 64% of nondisabled people were employed); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(a)(6) (2012) (finding that “census data, national polls, and other studies” have determined 
that disabled persons are economically disadvantaged); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 32–33 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314 (citing to several studies indicating that disabled 
persons are more likely to be unemployed and subject to poverty).  
 11 See Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 
(2012)); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (stating that the goals of the ADA include assuring “equality of 
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency” for disabled 
individuals); see also PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001) (noting that Congress 
passed the ADA to address pervasive discrimination against disabled persons). In 1990, when the 
ADA was enacted, there were approximately forty-three million disabled Americans. See Pub. L. 
101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 328. The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . ; (B) a record of such an impairment; 
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
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positions (“reassignment clause”).12 Courts have struggled with the scope of 
this statutory requirement because nondisabled employees can be adversely 
affected by the reassignment of disabled employees.13 
Pam Huber never received the router position because the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the ADA only provides disabled em-
ployees with the opportunity to compete for vacant positions.14 In that Cir-
cuit, employers are not required to reassign disabled employees to vacant po-
sitions if there are more qualified nondisabled candidates.15 If Pam Huber had 
worked in neighboring Oklahoma instead of Arkansas, however, she likely 
would have received the router position.16 This is because the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit holds that the ADA requires employers to do 
more than simply allow disabled employees to compete with nondisabled 
employees for reassignments.17 These dueling interpretations of the ADA’s 
reassignment clause have led to the unequal treatment of disabled employees 
from Circuit to Circuit.18 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has had the op-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (stating that employers must provide disabled employees 
with reasonable accommodations); id. § 12111(9)(B) (indicating that reasonable accommodations 
may include “reassignment to a vacant position”). 
 13 Compare, e.g., Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that the ADA does not require an employer to reassign a disabled employee if the reassignment 
would violate a seniority system established in a collectively bargained agreement), with Emrick 
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 396–97 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (finding that when a reas-
signment would conflict with a collectively bargained agreement, the fact finder must weigh the 
conflict in determining if a reassignment would be reasonable). See also Stephen F. Befort, Rea-
sonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Answers, 
Questions and Suggested Solutions After U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 
944–46 (2003) (arguing that reassignments have generated more litigation than any other reasona-
ble accommodation partly because of their impact on nondisabled employees). 
 14 See Huber II, 486 F.3d at 481, 483–84. 
 15 See id. at 483–84 (holding that an employer does not need to reassign a qualified disabled 
employee if such a reassignment would violate the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory poli-
cy of hiring the most qualified applicant). 
 16 See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
reassignment clause grants disabled employees more than just the opportunity to compete for 
vacant positions). 
 17 See id. at 1166–67; see also United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764–65; Aka v. Washington Hosp. 
Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 18 Compare Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483 (holding that disabled employees are not entitled to 
noncompetitive reassignments as a reasonable accommodation), with United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 
764–65 (holding that disabled employees are entitled to noncompetitive reassignments as a rea-
sonable accommodation), Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1166 (same), and Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304–06 
(same). Although there is currently a 1–3 circuit split, five other Circuits have held that the ADA 
does not provide disabled employees with preferential treatment and are therefore closely aligned 
with the Huber II court. See Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 459 (6th Cir. 2004); 
EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2001); Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 627 
(11th Cir. 1998); Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384–85 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995). Indeed, there may be no meaning-
ful difference between these five Circuits and the Eighth Circuit. See Supreme Court Declines to 
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portunity to resolve this circuit split, it recently declined to grant a petition for 
writ of certiorari in a case that would have put the ADA’s reassignment clause 
before the Court.19 
This Note discusses the development of the circuit split and offers a so-
lution for resolving the split in favor of entitling disabled employees to non-
competitive reassignments.20 Employers would thus have to reassign disabled 
employees to vacant positions before considering any nondisabled employ-
ees.21 Part I of this Note discusses the background of the ADA and the me-
chanics of the ADA’s reassignment clause.22 Part I then highlights a landmark 
U.S. Supreme Court decision that has further divided the lower courts.23 Part 
II analyzes the circuit split and the underlying rationales.24 Finally, Part III 
argues that the text and legislative history of the ADA support noncompetitive 
reassignments when no other reasonable accommodations allow a disabled 
employee to perform his or her essential job functions.25 Additionally, Part III 
discusses how noncompetitive reassignments have the potential to reduce 
government spending, whereas safeguards in both the ADA and U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Guidelines mitigate possi-
ble negative side effects of noncompetitive reassignments.26 Part III also of-
fers several recommendations that could resolve the circuit split in favor of 
noncompetitive reassignments.27 
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT’S REASSIGNMENT CLAUSE 
The current clash between the ADA’s reassignment clause and employ-
ers that utilize best-qualified reassignment policies has slowly developed over 
two decades.28 During the ADA’s early years, litigation focused on how the 
                                                                                                                           
Decide ADA Reassignment Question, THOMPSON’S ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, July 2013, at 1, 9–
11 (characterizing the circuit split as 6–3 as opposed to 3–1). 
 19 United Airlines, Inc. v. EEOC, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (United Airlines II) (denying certio-
rari). Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not provide any reasons for denying certiorari, it may 
have decided that the circuit split was not large enough to warrant attention. See Brief for the Re-
spondent in Opposition at 8–9, United Airlines II, 133 S. Ct 2734 (No. 12-707), 2013 WL 
1771083, at *8–9 (characterizing the conflict among the U.S. Courts of Appeals as only a “shal-
low” 3–1 circuit split). 
 20 See infra notes 106–225 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 155–225 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 28–79 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 80–105 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 106–154 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 155–186 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 187–202 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 203–225 and accompanying text. 
 28 Compare Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700 (becoming, in 1995, the first circuit to hold that the 
ADA does not grant disabled employees preferential treatment), and Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483 
(holding, in 2007, that the ADA does not require noncompetitive reassignments when employers 
2014] Reading into the ADA’s Reassignment Clause 1697 
Act defined disability.29 As this issue of what constitutes a disability has been 
resolved, the focus of the courts has shifted to the ADA’s reasonable accom-
modation requirement, which includes the reassignment clause.30 
Section A of this Part discusses the early stages of disability discrimina-
tion legislation and the origins of the ADA.31 Section B discusses both the 
ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement and the reassignment 
clause.32 Lastly, Section C discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2002 ruling in 
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, which held that the seniority rights of nondisa-
bled employees ordinarily trump the statutory right of disabled employees to 
be reassigned to vacant positions.33 
A. Early Efforts at Remedying Disability Discrimination  
and the Birth of the ADA 
Disabled Americans slowly gained statutory protections over the latter 
half of the twentieth century.34 As a result of the African American Civil 
                                                                                                                           
maintain best-qualified reassignment policies), with United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764–65 (support-
ing, in 2011, noncompetitive reassignments for disabled employees). 
 29 See Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues: Reas-
signment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 440 (2002) (stating that litigation 
regarding the scope of the ADA’s disability definition “occupied center stage” in the courts during 
the 1990s). In one year alone five U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressed the scope of the term 
“disability.” See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 562–67 (1999); Murphy v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521–25 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 
481–94 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 801–04 (1999); Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630–48 (1998). In 2008, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act 
(“ADAAA”) partly to clarify the intended meaning of disability. See Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (codified as amended in various provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213) (noting in 
the Act’s findings and purposes that Congress’s intended interpretation of the term disability had 
not been adhered to); EMILY A. BENFER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POL-
ICY, THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT CHANGES TO THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 2–3 (2009) (explaining how the ADAAA realigned the meaning of disa-
bility to comport with Congress’s original intent). 
 30 Befort, supra note 29, at 440 (indicating that although the ADA’s first decade of litigation 
focused on the scope of the definition of disability, current litigation focuses on the reasonable 
accommodation requirement); Reagan S. Bissonnette, Note, Reasonably Accommodating Nonmit-
igating Plaintiffs After the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 B.C. L. REV. 859, 873–74 (2009) 
(stating that the ADAAA broadened the definition of disability and therefore shifted the focus of 
ADA litigation towards the meaning of the reasonable accommodation requirement). 
 31 See infra notes 34–52 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 53–79 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 80–105 and accompanying text. 
 34 See Allison Duncan, Note, Defining Disability in the ADA: Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 
60 LA. L. REV. 967, 967–70 (2000) (providing a brief overview of the history of disability dis-
crimination legislation); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from 
Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of 
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 415–30 (1997) (discussing the history surrounding the enact-
ment of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act). 
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Rights Movement, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.35 Title VII 
of this landmark piece of legislation made it unlawful for employers to dis-
criminate against individuals on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.”36 Despite this sweeping language, the statute does not bar em-
ployers from discriminating against individuals with disabilities.37 This ex-
clusion of disability from Title VII may have been caused by a continuing 
perception that disability, unlike race or sex, can be a valid basis for making 
an employment determination.38 Less than a decade later, however, Congress 
passed the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, which became the first federal statute to 
offer limited protections to the disabled.39 This legislation would serve as the 
framework for the modern-day ADA.40 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construction of Multiple Con-
sciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 463, 490 (1996) (observ-
ing that the civil rights movement of the 1960s increased public awareness of discrimination and 
led to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The 1964 Civil Rights 
Act: The Crucial Role of Social Movements in the Enactment and Implementation of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1147, 1148 (2005) (arguing that the civil rights move-
ment of the 1960s was the primary impetus for the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see The Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000h-6 (2012)). 
 36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is widely recognized as both the 
broadest and most important federal anti-discrimination statute. See Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 
1147 (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is both the most important and the most powerful 
anti-discrimination statute ever passed by Congress); Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: 
Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 957 (2005) (arguing 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the most far reaching anti-discrimination statute passed by 
Congress). 
 37 See Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that Title VII does 
not prevent employers from discriminating on the basis of disability); Learned v. City of Bellevue, 
860 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that Title VII does not provide a remedy for employ-
ment discrimination based solely on “physical and mental limitations”); Torres-Alman v. Verizon 
Wireless P.R., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 367, 381 (D.P.R. 2007) (indicating that the text of Title VII 
does not extend to disability discrimination claims). 
 38 Compare City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (declining to 
extend “heightened scrutiny” protection to individuals suffering mental illnesses), and D’Amato v. 
Wis. Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1486 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that “handicaps can be legitimate rea-
sons for exclusion from some jobs—unlike discrimination based on race, ethnic origin, sex, reli-
gion or politics”), with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 (1973) (stating that 
Title VII bars employers from engaging in racial discrimination in any employment decisions), 
and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (recognizing sex as a “suspect criteria” for 
employment decisions, whereas physical disability is a “non-suspect status”). 
 39 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012), amended by 
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 113-128, 128 Stat. 1425 (2014)); Smith 
v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1990) (observing that the Rehabilitation Act was the first 
significant federal statute to protect disabled persons). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states 
that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his 
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim-
ination under any program or activity” of a federal agency or a private employer receiving federal 
funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Rehabilitation Act defines an “individual with a disability” as an 
individual who “has a physical or mental impairment which for such individual constitutes or 
2014] Reading into the ADA’s Reassignment Clause 1699 
Although the 1973 Rehabilitation Act was originally designed to help 
states devise and execute vocational rehabilitative programs for the disabled, 
the statute was soon expanded to prohibit all federal agencies and private em-
ployers receiving federal funding from discriminating against the disabled.41 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s it became apparent that America’s disabled 
population was growing and that the Rehabilitation Act failed to protect a 
sizable portion of this population.42 The legislation was ineffective primarily 
because it did not bar private employers not receiving federal funding (the 
majority of private employers) from discriminating against the disabled.43 
Congress, in an effort to fill this considerable gap in anti-discrimination pro-
tection, enacted the ADA in 1990.44 
                                                                                                                           
results in a substantial impediment to employment; and . . . can benefit in terms of an employment 
outcome from vocational rehabilitation services.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 40 See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing the 
1973 Rehabilitation Act as being a precursor to the ADA); Sarah J. Parrot, Note, The ADA and 
Reasonable Accommodation of Employees Regarded as Disabled: Statutory Fact or Bizarre Fic-
tion?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1495, 1500 (2006) (same). 
 41 See Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 412 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing the statute’s 
evolution); Michael D. Moberly, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: The Employer’s Duty to Accommo-
date Perceived Disabilities, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 603, 607 (1998) (same). The Rehabilitation Act has 
always required federal agencies to adopt affirmative action plans for hiring disabled persons. 
§ 501, 87 Stat. 355, 390–91 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 791(b)) (providing for affirmative 
action policies at the time of the Act’s passage). The original version of the Rehabilitation Act, 
however, did not provide disabled persons with a private right of action. See Boyd, 752 F. 2d at 
412. In 1978, the Rehabilitation Act was amended to include such a right. Pub. L. No. 95-602, sec. 
120, § 505, 92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (2012)) (providing that the 
rights and remedies available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act are available to a person 
filing a complaint under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act). 
 42 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2012) (stating that discrimination against disabled persons 
continues in many areas including employment, education, housing, and transportation); Lissa 
Martinez, Note, Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc.: Employers’ Duty of Reasonable Accommoda-
tion Under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, 26 W. ST. U. L. REV. 71, 79 (1999) 
(stating that, although the Rehabilitation Act was a “significant first step” towards protecting disa-
bled persons, it is limited to the federal government, federal contractors, and recipients of federal 
aid); see also Carrie L. Flores, Note, A Disability Is Not a Trump Card: The Americans with Disa-
bilities Act Does Not Entitle Disabled Employees to Automatic Reassignment, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 
195, 203 (2008) (indicating that millions of Americans suffered from a disability in 1990 and that 
the number would continue to grow). 
 43 Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 19 (stating that the Rehabilitation Act is limited to “federal 
agencies, contractors and recipients of federal financial assistance”); Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 
827, 830 (3d Cir. 1996) (indicating that the Rehabilitation Act only applies to federal employers or 
private employers receiving federal funding). 
 44 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)); see 
Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1368 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (citing Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 
325, 330 (3d Cir. 1995)). The ADA was supported by President George H.W. Bush and a substan-
tial majority of both Houses of Congress. Presidential Statement on Signing the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1165 (July 30, 1990) (stating that Presi-
dent George H.W. Bush signed the bill into law on July 26, 1990); House Overwhelmingly Ap-
proves Bill to Bar Employment Bias Against Disabled, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at A-16 
(May 23, 1990) (asserting that the House of Representatives passed the ADA by a vote of 403 to 
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The ADA, unlike its predecessor, prohibits all private employers of fif-
teen or more employees from discriminating against the disabled.45 Conse-
quently, covered employers cannot consider disability “in regard to job appli-
cation procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em-
ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges 
of employment.”46 Many herald this expansion in protection for disabled per-
sons as the crowning achievement of the disability rights movement.47 In his 
final remarks at the ADA signing ceremony, President George H. W. Bush 
compared the new law to the fall of the Berlin Wall.48 
Although the ADA expanded the scope of disability discrimination pro-
tection, it also retained many core components of the Rehabilitation Act.49 
For example, the ADA’s definition of “disability” is nearly identical to the 
definition of “handicapped person” in the EEOC regulations implementing 
                                                                                                                           
20); Senate Passage of Civil Rights Bill Moves Debate over Disabled to House, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 174, at A-5 (Sept. 11, 1989) (indicating that the Senate passed the ADA by a vote of 
seventy-six to eight). 
 45 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting covered entities from discriminating against 
disabled persons under the ADA), and id. § 12111(2), (5)(A) (stating that covered entities include 
employers of fifteen or more employees under the ADA), with 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (requiring only 
that federal agencies establish affirmative action programs for disabled persons under the Rehabil-
itation Act). See also Matthew Graham Zagrodzky, Comment, When Employees Become Disa-
bled: Does the Americans with Disabilities Act Require Consideration of a Transfer as a Reason-
able Accommodation?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 939, 943 (1997) (discussing the expansion in disability 
protection with the passage of the ADA). Although the ADA covers private employers, it also 
prohibits states and local governments from discriminating against the disabled. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12132 (prohibiting public entities from discriminating against disabled persons); id. 
§ 12131(1)(A) (stating that public entities include state and local governments). 
 46 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
 47 Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. 
REV. 27, 30 (2000) (describing the ADA as the “culmination of the civil rights movement”); see 
136 CONG. REC. 21,923 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (describing the ADA as the “emancipa-
tion proclamation for people with disabilities”). The ADA has also been labeled a “virtual revolu-
tion” for the rights of the disabled. Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); 
see also Lynn J. Harris, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Australia’s Disability 
Discrimination Act: Overcoming the Inadequacies, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51, 97 
(1999). 
 48 Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1067, 
1069 (July 26, 1990) (“[N]ow I sign legislation which takes a sledgehammer to another wall, one 
which has for too many generations separated Americans with disabilities from the freedom they 
could glimpse, but not grasp.”). Nearly two thousand disabled Americans filled the White House 
lawn to listen to the President’s signing ceremony speech and celebrate the passage of the Act. 
Don Shannon, Spirits Soar as Disabled Rights Become the Law, L.A. Times, July 27, 1990, http://
articles.latimes.com/1990-07-27/news/mn-573_1_disabled-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/4SVJ-
XPD6. Evan Kemp, a commissioner of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
described it as “the greatest day of [his] life.” Id. 
 49 See Flores, supra note 42, at 202 (observing that Congress integrated the language and 
requirements of the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA). 
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the Rehabilitation Act.50 Moreover, cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act 
are frequently relied upon in litigation involving the ADA.51 One major dif-
ference between the original version of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA is 
that only the ADA requires employers to consider reassigning disabled em-
ployees to vacant positions.52 
B. Reasonable Accommodations and the Reassignment Clause 
Title I of the ADA prohibits private employers of fifteen or more em-
ployees from discriminating against “qualified individual[s] on the basis of 
disability.”53 To bring a discrimination claim under the ADA, an employee 
must establish that he or she (1) is a qualified individual, (2) has a disability, 
(3) suffered an adverse employment action because of his or her disability, 
and (4) that at least fifteen employees work for the employer.54 The Act de-
fines “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment posi-
tion that such individual holds or desires.”55 Under this definition, an em-
                                                                                                                           
 50 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012) (defining “disability” under the ADA), with 34 
C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(1) (2014) (defining “handicapped person” under the Rehabilitation Act’s im-
plementing regulations). A disabled or handicapped person is an individual with “a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual . . . 
a record of such an impairment; or . . . being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(1); see 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(1) (defining “handicapped person” with minor grammatical 
differences). 
 51 See White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that the lan-
guage of the ADA tracks the language of the Rehabilitation Act and that the ADA mandates inter-
pretations that avoid inconsistent standards between the two statutes); Robert J. Brookes, Recent 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act Cases, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 861, 864 (1993) (observing that Reha-
bilitation Act cases are persuasive authority when considering ADA claims); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12201(a) (stating that the ADA’s standards are as strict as the standards of the Rehabilitation 
Act). 
 52 See Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1045, 1058 (2000) (indicating that although the language of the ADA closely follows the 
language of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA departs from the Rehabilitation Act with its reas-
signment clause). In 1992, however, the Rehabilitation Act was amended to include a reassign-
ment requirement. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, §§ 503 & 505, 
106 Stat. 4344, 4424, 4428 (1992) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d) (2012)) (incorporating 
the ADA’s standards, including a reassignment requirement). 
 53 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see id. §§ 12111(2), 12111(5)(A). 
 54 Robinson v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 94 F.3d 499, 501 (8th Cir. 1996); Katz v. City Metal Co., 
Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1996); White, 45 F.3d at 360–61; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 
12111(5)(A), 12112(a). Although employers with fewer than fifteen employees are not covered by 
the ADA, these smaller employers are frequently covered by state disability discrimination statutes. 
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-51(10) (2014) (covering employers with at least three employ-
ees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1(5) (2014) (covering employers with at least six employees); 
MINN. STAT. § 363A.03 (subd. 16) (2014) (covering employers with at least one employee). 
 55 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
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ployer must first identify the essential functions of the employment posi-
tion.56 Then, the employer must determine if the disabled employee would be 
able to perform these functions with reasonable accommodations.57 
 The ADA states that discrimination includes the failure to make “rea-
sonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability.”58 In other words, if a disa-
bled employee could perform the essential functions of his or her job with 
reasonable accommodations, his or her employer must provide those accom-
modations.59 Most reasonable accommodations involve either the modifica-
tion or adjustment of a workplace environment, working conditions, or appli-
cation process.60 The ADA also provides a nonexclusive list of accommoda-
tions that may be reasonable, which includes reassignments to vacant posi-
tions.61 
Many courts hold that employers have a mandatory obligation to engage 
in an interactive process with disabled employees to determine which ac-
commodations are most reasonable under the circumstances.62 This interac-
                                                                                                                           
 56 Befort & Donesky, supra note 52, at 1051; see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012). Essential 
functions are the “fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disabil-
ity holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2014). For example, in most jobs, physical attend-
ance in the workplace is an essential function. Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 
1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998); Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 726–27 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(per curiam). 
 57 Befort & Donesky, supra note 52, at 1051; see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
 58 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Statutory accommodations, such as the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodation requirement, are designed to “prohibit employers from acting on the normally 
legitimate desire to save money.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommoda-
tion, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 828 (2003). 
 59 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (providing the reasonable accommodation requirement); 
see also Jeffrey O. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of 
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1423, 1430 (1991) (asserting that if an employer refuses to provide an accommoda-
tion that would allow a disabled employee to perform her job, and the accommodation would not 
impose an undue burden on the employer, the employer is violating the ADA). But see infra notes 
66–68 and accompanying text (describing some instances when employers do not have to accom-
modate disabled employees). 
 60 See 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(o) (providing a broad definition of reasonable accommodation along 
with a nonexclusive list of possible accommodations). 
 61 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)–(B). The ADA’s list of reasonable accommodations also includes 
making existing facilities accessible, job restructuring, providing part-time or modified work 
schedules, modifying or acquiring equipment, adjusting examinations or training materials, and 
providing interpreters or readers. Id. Apart from this list, the ADA does not provide a definition 
for reasonable accommodations. Jill S. Kingsbury, “Must We Talk About That Reasonable Ac-
commodation?”: The Eighth Circuit Says Yes, But Is the Answer Reasonable?, 65 MO. L. REV. 
967, 976 n.70 (2000) (stating that, instead of defining the term “reasonable accommodation,” the 
ADA provides a list of what a reasonable accommodation might be). 
 62 Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated sub nom. 
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (stating that most circuits require employers to 
engage in an interactive process); Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1172 (noting that the duty to partic-
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tive process is meant to be a flexible discussion that accounts for the physical 
and mental limitations of the disabled employee as well as the nature of the 
employment position.63 The goal is to identify which accommodations will 
allow disabled employees to perform their essential job functions and then 
determine if providing these accommodations will be reasonable.64 If no rea-
sonable accommodation is possible, however, the employer cannot be sued 
for failing to engage in the interactive process.65 
Despite the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement, an employ-
er does not have to provide a particular accommodation if it would inflict an 
“undue hardship” on the employer’s business.66 According to the ADA, an 
undue hardship is an “action requiring significant difficulty or expense” when 
considered in light of several factors.67 Absent an undue hardship defense, an 
employer’s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation violates the 
ADA.68 
Reassigning disabled employees to vacant positions has proven to be 
one of the most difficult reasonable accommodations to implement.69 Most 
reasonable accommodations, such as job restructuring or modified work 
                                                                                                                           
ipate in an interactive process is intrinsic in the statutory obligation of providing reasonable ac-
commodations to disabled employees); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (describing the interactive process as an employer’s “obligation”). At least two legal 
scholars point out that, despite these court holdings, the ADA itself does not provide disabled 
employees with an independent right to an interactive process. Grant T. Collins & Penelope J. 
Phillips, Overview of Reasonable Accommodation and the Shifting Emphasis from Who Is Disa-
bled to Who Can Work, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 469, 484 (2011). 
 63 See Befort, supra note 29, at 445–46 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (2014)). 
 64 See Collins & Phillips, supra note 62, at 482. 
 65 E.g., Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 2000); Donahue v. Consol. Rail 
Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 233–35 (3d Cir. 2000); Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 
1997) (per curiam). An employer successfully demonstrates an absence of reasonable accommo-
dations if no accommodations would allow the disabled employee to continue performing the 
essential functions of his or her job. See Willis, 108 F.3d at 284 (citing 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (1997)) (indicating that for an accommodation to be reasonable it must allow 
the disabled employee to continue to perform the essential functions of his or her job). 
 66 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012); see Rachel Schneller Ziegler, Note, Safe, but Not 
Sound: Limiting Safe Harbor Immunity for Health and Disability Insurers and Self-Insured Em-
ployers Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 101 MICH. L. REV. 840, 868 (2002) (indicating 
that undue hardship is an affirmative defense that can always be raised by an employer). 
 67 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). These factors include, but are not limited to, the nature and cost 
of the accommodation, the resources of the facility providing the accommodation, the resources of 
the disabled employee’s employer, and the type of operations of the employer. Id. 
§ 12111(10)(B)(i)–(iv). 
 68 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Befort, supra note 29, at 447. If an employer violates the 
ADA, a court may grant equitable relief, back pay of up to two years, and reasonable attorney’s 
fees. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); id. § 2000e-5(g) (2012). 
 69 Befort, supra note 29, at 447 (arguing that reassignments and leave of absences are the 
most difficult reasonable accommodations); Befort & Donesky, supra note 52, at 1056 (arguing 
that reassignments have generated more litigation and fueled more controversy than any other 
accommodation).  
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schedules, have little impact on nondisabled employees who can continue to 
perform their jobs as normal.70 Reassigning disabled employees to vacant 
positions, however, directly affects nondisabled employees by preventing 
them from applying for the vacant positions.71 Furthermore, when a disabled 
employee is reassigned to a vacant position, an employer must expend re-
sources to locate and train a new employee to fill the position formerly held 
by the disabled employee.72 Perhaps most problematic is the fact that an em-
ployer may be confronted with the undesirable choice of reassigning a disa-
bled employee to a vacant position or instead filling the position with a more 
qualified applicant.73 
Recognizing these unique difficulties, the EEOC’s regulations interpret-
ing the ADA place additional restrictions on the reassignment clause.74 Ac-
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1314–15 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (stating that most reasonable ac-
commodations only affect the disabled employee and the employer). 
 71 Befort, supra note 29, at 448. Admittedly, when a disabled employee is reassigned to a 
vacant position, nondisabled employees have the opportunity to apply for the disabled employee’s 
old position. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305 n.29; see also Befort, supra note 29, at 448 (discussing the 
“reshuffling of the workplace environment”). With that said, the case law indicates that disabled 
employees tend to request reassignment to a more desirable position than the position they occu-
pied before becoming disabled. See, e.g., Huber II, 486 F.3d at 481 (attempting to be reassigned 
from a dry grocery order filler to a more coveted router position); Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 351 (at-
tempting to work on the first shift instead of the less preferable second or third shifts). 
 72 Befort, supra note 29, at 448. At least one study estimates that it costs employers approxi-
mately one fifth of a departing employee’s salary to train a replacement employee. HEATHER 
BOUSHEY & SARAH JANE GLYNN, CTR. AM. PROGRESS, THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT COSTS TO 
REPLACING EMPLOYEES 1 (Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/CostofTurnover.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3RAB-3MYW. 
 73 See Huber II, 486 F.3d at 481 (choosing a more qualified nondisabled employee for a va-
cant position instead of a disabled employee). 
 74 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2014) (indicating that reasonable accommodations may include “reas-
signment to a vacant position”); INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT, APPENDIX TO PART 1630 (2013) [hereinafter APPENDIX], available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2013-title29-vol4/xml/CFR-2013-title29-vol4-part1630.xml, archived 
at http://perma.cc/BN6K-QGT3 (providing a brief explanation of the reassignment clause’s require-
ments and restrictions); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION & UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILI-
TIES ACT, NO. 915.002 (2002), 2002 WL 31994335, at *20–23 [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement 
Guidance] (providing an explanation of what the reassignment clause requires and does not re-
quire). The EEOC is the agency charged with interpreting and implementing the ADA. See 42 
U.S.C § 12116 (2012) (stating that the “Commission” must issue regulations to implement Title I 
of the ADA); id. § 12111 (defining the “Commission” as the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission); see also id. § 2000e-4 (2012). To accomplish this mission, the EEOC has issued 
formal regulations, interpretive guidance, and informal enforcement guidance. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630; APPENDIX, supra; EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra. This Note emphasizes the en-
forcement guidance because it addresses the reassignment clause in much greater detail than the 
EEOC’s formal regulations or interpretive guidance. Compare EEOC Enforcement Guidance, 
supra, at *20–34 (referring to the reassignment clause close to one hundred times), with 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(o) (referring to the reassignment clause fewer than twenty times), and APPENDIX, supra 
(referring to the reassignment clause over a dozen times). The EEOC guidance, however, is not 
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cording to the EEOC, reassignment is the accommodation of last resort, 
which means an employer only needs to consider reassignment if no other 
accommodation would allow a disabled employee to continue to perform the 
essential functions of his or her job.75 An employer is also not required to cre-
ate a new position or remove a nondisabled employee from a position to reas-
sign a disabled employee.76 If no equivalent position is vacant, an employer 
may reassign a disabled employee to a lower level position.77 On the other 
hand, a disabled employee cannot be reassigned to a higher-level position 
without first competing for it.78 Moreover, unlike other reasonable accommo-
dations, the reassignment clause only applies to employees and does not ap-
ply to job applicants.79 
C. U.S. Airways v. Barnett: The Clash Between Seniority Systems  
and the Reassignment Clause 
Moving a disabled employee to a vacant position—and overriding a sen-
iority system’s rules—is a classic example of nondisabled employees being 
adversely affected by the reassignment clause.80 A seniority system is a 
framework that, alone or in connection with other non-seniority criteria, 
                                                                                                                           
binding upon courts and is only persuasive authority. See Theodore W. Wern, Note, Judicial Def-
erence to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a 
Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST L.J. 1533, 1535 n.9 (1999) (stating that the ADA’s enforce-
ment guidance is entitled to only a small amount of deference); see also Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 899 n.3 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that EEOC’s interpretative guidance, 
which was attached as an appendix to the formal regulations, does not carry the force of law). 
 75 EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *20 (indicating that reassignment is the 
“reasonable accommodation of last resort,” unless both the employer and disabled employee vol-
untarily agree to a reassignment); see APPENDIX, supra note 74 (asserting that “reassignment 
should be considered only when accommodation within the individual’s current position would 
pose an undue hardship”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345 (stating that a reassignment should only be considered after the employer 
makes efforts to accommodate the disabled worker in the position he or she was hired to fill). 
 76 EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *21 (stating that an employer “does not 
have to bump an employee from a job in order to create a vacancy; nor does it have to create a 
new position”). According to the EEOC enforcement guidance, “vacant” means that the employ-
ment position is “available when the employee asks for reasonable accommodation, or that the 
employer knows that it will become available within a reasonable amount of time.” Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. (noting that disabled employees must compete for promotions). 
 79 APPENDIX, supra note 74; EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *22. 
 80 See Befort, supra note 29, at 456 (describing seniority systems as a common method for 
filling job vacancies that can conflict with the ADA’s reassignment clause). This Note addresses 
best-qualified reassignment policies, which are distinct from seniority systems. See United Air-
lines, 693 F.3d at 764 (finding that best-qualified reassignment policies are not identical to seniori-
ty systems). Although not directly on point, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett is a critical component 
of any reasonable accommodation discussion because it provides the analytical framework for 
determining if an accommodation is either reasonable or an undue hardship. See 535 U.S. 391, 
401–02, 405 (2002). 
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grants employees improving employment rights and benefits as the length of 
their employment increases.81 Employers commonly use these systems as an 
objective method to make decisions regarding salary increases, promotions, 
layoffs, or even position reassignments.82 Under a seniority system, the rules 
for career advancement are clearly articulated and each employee expects that 
all other employees must abide by the system’s rules.83 A strict application of 
the ADA’s reassignment clause could be problematic because it would cir-
cumvent the established rules upon which employees rely.84 
In 2002, in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the U.S. Supreme Court ad-
dressed a conflict between the reassignment clause and seniority systems.85 
The plaintiff, an employee of U.S. Airways, injured his back in 1990 while 
working as a cargo handler.86 At that time, the airline maintained a seniority 
bidding system where employees could bid on a job position and the most 
senior bidder would receive the position.87 Following his back injury, the 
plaintiff successfully used this seniority bidding system to obtain a job in the 
airline’s mailroom.88 In 1992, however, the plaintiff lost his mailroom posi-
tion because a more senior employee had bid on it through the seniority sys-
tem.89 The plaintiff failed to convince his employer to make an exception to 
the rules of the seniority system to accommodate his disability.90 
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the five-justice majority, explained 
that if an employer demonstrates that a reassignment of a disabled employee 
conflicts with the rules of a seniority system, the reassignment will normally 
                                                                                                                           
 81 California Brewers Ass’n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605–06 (1980). 
 82 See U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 404 (discussing a few of the benefits that seniority systems 
provide); Blake Sonne, Note, Employment Law: Reasonable Accommodation Under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act vs. Employee Seniority Rights: Understanding the Real Conflict in U.S. 
Airways v. Barnett, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 225, 229 (2004) (discussing additional benefits of seniority 
systems). 
 83 See U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 404 (noting that employer-established seniority systems are 
useful because they “provide[] important employee benefits by creating, and fulfilling, employee 
expectations of fair, uniform treatment”). 
 84 See id. at 405 (suggesting that Congress did not intend to use the ADA to undermine the 
expectations that seniority systems create). 
 85 Id. at 406. This was the first time the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the reasonable ac-
commodation requirement. Befort, supra note 13, at 933; see U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 396–406. 
 86 U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 394. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. The plaintiff sought the mailroom position because it was less physically demanding 
than the cargo handler position. Id. 
 89 Id. Earlier that year, U.S. Airways laid off over seven thousand employees due to poor 
financial performance. Brief for Petitioner at 5, U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. 391 (No. 00-1250), 2001 
WL 747864, at *5. Due to these layoffs, U.S. Airways reopened the competitive bidding process 
for all mailroom positions. Id. 
 90 U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 394. 
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be considered unreasonable.91 As a general rule, however, the Court stated 
that an accommodation for a disabled employee is not automatically unrea-
sonable solely because it allows the disabled employee to violate an employ-
er-established rule that nondisabled employees must follow.92 Instead, it will 
sometimes be reasonable and will sometimes be unreasonable to allow disa-
bled employees to depart from employer-established rules.93 The Court 
adopted a multi-step analysis to determine if a particular accommodation 
would qualify as reasonable under the ADA. 94 
Under this new analytical framework, a disabled employee can prove 
that an accommodation is reasonable in one of two ways.95 First, an employee 
can demonstrate that an accommodation “seems reasonable on its face, i.e., 
ordinarily or in the run of cases.”96 If the employee is able to show that the 
accommodation is reasonable through this first method, the burden then shifts 
to the employer to prove that the accommodation would be an undue hard-
ship.97 According to the Court, determining if an accommodation is an undue 
hardship is a case-specific inquiry that focuses on how the accommodation 
will adversely affect the employer.98 Second, an employee also has the option 
of demonstrating that an accommodation is reasonable “on the particular 
facts.”99 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Id. at 406 (holding that ordinarily the ADA does not require an employer to reassign a 
disabled employee to a position that a nondisabled employee is entitled to under the employer’s 
established seniority system). 
 92 Id. at 398; see Shapiro v. Twp. of Lakewood, 292 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying 
this general rule). 
 93 See U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 398. 
 94 See id. at 401–02, 405; Shapiro, 292 F.3d at 361; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) 
(2012) (providing the reasonable accommodation requirement). In fashioning this new method of 
analysis, the Court noted that its approach aligned with the practice of lower courts. See U.S. Air-
ways, 535 U.S. at 401–02. 
 95 U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 401–02, 405; Shapiro, 292 F.3d at 361. 
 96 U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 401–02; see Shapiro, 292 F.3d at 360–61. For an accommodation 
to be reasonable on its face or in the run of cases it only needs to be feasible or plausible. U.S. 
Airways, 535 U.S. at 401–02. For example, if the essential functions of a hearing impaired em-
ployee’s position required her to contact the public by telephone, installing a teletypewriter 
(“TTY”) would be reasonable on its face because installation is both feasible and plausible. See 
EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *3. A TTY is a device that allows hearing im-
paired individuals to communicate by telephone. Id. at *3 n.11. 
 97 U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 402; Shapiro, 292 F.3d at 361; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (establishing the undue hardship affirmative defense). 
 98 See U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 402; see also Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (stating that an undue hardship analysis examines the hardships created by the plaintiff’s 
requested accommodation with an eye to the employer’s unique situation). 
 99 U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 405; Shapiro, 292 F.3d at 361. If an employee is successful under 
this second method, it is difficult for the employer to raise an affirmative defense of undue hard-
ship because most accommodations are not simultaneously reasonable on the particular facts and 
unduly burdensome. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(noting that describing an accommodation as unreasonable or an undue hardship can “merge” into 
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Applying this multi-step analysis, the Court held that it is ordinarily un-
reasonable for a disability-related reassignment to violate an established sen-
iority system.100 The primary rationale for this holding, according to the 
Court, is that the case law for other types of discrimination claims highlights 
the importance of employer-established seniority systems in the workplace.101 
Building on this case law, the Court reasoned that a seniority system is bene-
ficial to the workplace because it establishes employee expectations of stand-
ardized treatment.102 Employees, understanding that they will be treated equal-
ly under a seniority system, make a long-term investment in the employer in 
return for benefits later in their careers.103 A reassignment of a disabled work-
er, in violation of a seniority system’s rules, ordinarily is unjustified because 
it disrupts these expectations of standardized treatment.104 After holding that a 
disability reassignment in violation of a seniority system is invalid on its face, 
the Court remanded the case to the lower court to provide the parties with an 
opportunity to argue if reassignment would be a reasonable accommodation 
in this particular case.105 
II. AN ENDURING CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE MODERN LANDSCAPE OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT’S REASSIGNMENT CLAUSE 
Following the decision in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett in 2002, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has offered little guidance for interpreting the Americans with 
Disabilities Act’s (“ADA”) reassignment clause.106 In 2007, the Court agreed 
to address the ADA reassignment clause in Wal-Mart Stores v. Huber; howev-
                                                                                                                           
the same argument); Hall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1988) (indicating that 
an unreasonable accommodation is identical to an accommodation imposing an undue hardship). 
See generally Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
1119 (2010) (arguing that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are “two sides of the 
same coin”). 
 100 U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 403 (“[I]t would not be reasonable in the run of cases that the 
assignment in question trump the rules of a seniority system.”). 
 101 See id. at 403–04; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79–81 
(1977) (determining that an employer does not need to schedule around an employee’s religious 
practices as a reasonable accommodation in a Title VII religious discrimination claim when doing 
so would violate the employer’s established seniority system); Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047 (observing 
that “courts have been unanimous in rejecting the claim that ‘reasonable accommodation’ under 
the Rehabilitation Act requires reassignment of a disabled employee in violation of a bona fide 
seniority system”). 
 102 U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 404. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See id. at 404–05. 
 105 Id. at 406. 
 106 See United Airlines, Inc. v. EEOC, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (denying certiorari without 
comment in a case involving an interpretation of the reassignment clause); Jackson v. Fuji Photo 
Film, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2104 (2012) (same).  
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er, the parties settled the case in 2008, prior to oral argument.107 Then, in 
2012, in Jackson v. Fuji Photo Film, Inc., the Court declined without com-
ment to interpret the reassignment clause.108 Most recently, in 2013, in EEOC 
v. United Airlines, Inc., the Court again declined to confront the ADA’s reas-
signment clause.109 
In the absence of U.S. Supreme Court guidance, lower federal courts 
have struggled to determine what employers must do to abide by the reas-
signment clause.110 In particular, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are divided on 
whether the reassignment clause compels employers to reassign disabled em-
ployees to vacant positions without first requiring them to compete with qual-
ified nondisabled candidates.111 Section A of this Part discusses the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals that either directly or implicitly require disabled employees 
to compete for vacant positions along with nondisabled persons.112 Section B 
then discusses a minority of U.S. Courts of Appeals holding that disabled 
employees are entitled to noncompetitive reassignments as a reasonable ac-
commodation.113 
A. Disabled Employee vs. Nondisabled Employee:  
A Fight for Job Vacancies 
Currently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is the only 
circuit court to have held that disabled employees are not entitled to noncom-
petitive reassignments as a reasonable accommodation.114 Five other U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See 128 S. Ct. 742 (2007) (granting certiorari); 128 S. Ct. 1116 (2008) (dismissing certio-
rari without comment); Nicholas A. Dorsey, Note, Mandatory Reassignment Under the ADA: The 
Circuit Split and Need for a Socio-Political Understanding of Disability, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
443, 445 (2009) (noting that Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Huber II), 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 
2007) was dismissed because the parties agreed to a settlement). 
 108 132 S. Ct. 2104 (2012) (denying certiorari without comment). 
 109 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (denying certiorari without comment). 
 110 See Befort & Donesky, supra note 52, at 1056 (noting that “federal courts have split on at 
least four issues concerning the scope of an employer’s reassignment duty”); Dorsey, supra note 
107, at 459–60 (discussing the range of opinions among the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals re-
garding reassignments in the context of best-qualified reassignment policies). 
 111 Compare Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483 (holding that disabled employees are not entitled to 
noncompetitive reassignments as a reasonable accommodation), with United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 
764–65 (holding that disabled employees are entitled to noncompetitive reassignments as a rea-
sonable accommodation), Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1166–67 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(same), and Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304–05 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(same). 
 112 See infra notes 114–134 and accompanying text. 
 113 See infra notes 135–154 and accompanying text. 
 114 See Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483. At the time Huber II was decided, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit had also held that the ADA did not require noncompetitive reassign-
ments. EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by 
EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012). In 2012, however, the Seventh Cir-
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Courts of Appeals, however, hold that the ADA never affords disabled em-
ployees preferential treatment and are therefore closely aligned with the 
Eighth Circuit.115 In these jurisdictions, disabled employees seeking reas-
signment to vacant positions must compete with qualified nondisabled candi-
dates without any statutory preference.116 In other words, employers are per-
mitted to choose a more qualified nondisabled candidate without ever consid-
ering reassigning a less qualified disabled employee.117 
The primary rationale for requiring disabled employees to compete with 
nondisabled employees is that the ADA is not an affirmative action statute.118 
In this context courts implicitly use affirmative action as a synonym for pref-
erential treatment.119 Therefore, because noncompetitive reassignments are a 
form of preferential treatment, the ADA does not entitle disabled employees 
to avoid competing with nondisabled employees.120 Under this theory, grant-
ing disabled employees automatic reassignments despite best-qualified reas-
signment policies would be “affirmative action with a vengeance.”121 
Instead of being an affirmative action statute, these Circuits claim that 
Congress intended the ADA to be a nondiscrimination, or anti-discrimination, 
                                                                                                                           
cuit reconsidered its ruling and held that the ADA’s reassignment clause does require noncompeti-
tive reassignments. United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764–65. 
 115 See Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 459 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
although the ADA may require an employer to reassign a disabled employee it does not require an 
employer to provide preferential treatment); EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 
2001) (holding that employers must be allowed to treat disabled employees and nondisabled em-
ployees equally under a seniority system); Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that Congress did not intend to provide disabled employees with preferential treatment); 
Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384–85 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that employ-
ers are only required to treat disabled employees and other similarly qualified nondisabled em-
ployees equally); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
disabled employees do not need to be granted priority over nondisabled employees for reassign-
ments). 
 116 See Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483; Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 459; Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 355; Ter-
rell, 132 F.3d at 627; Wernick, 91 F.3d at 384–85; Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700. 
 117 See Huber II, 486 F.3d at 484 (holding that the employer-defendant was not required to 
deny a more qualified applicant for a router position in order to provide the position to a disabled 
plaintiff). 
 118 See id. at 483 (agreeing with other courts that the ADA is neither an affirmative action 
statute nor a mandatory preference statute); Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700 (stating that the ADA does 
not require affirmative action in favor of disabled workers because it does not require prioritizing 
disabled workers over nondisabled workers in hiring or reassignment decisions). 
 119 See Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 459 (indicating that an employer does not have to grant a disa-
bled employee “preferential treatment” when considering them for a vacant position); Terrell, 132 
F.3d at 627 (stating that Congress did not intend to grant preferential treatment to disabled work-
ers); Wernick, 91 F.3d at 384–85 (holding that, although employers must treat disabled employees 
and nondisabled employees equally, employers do not have an “affirmative duty” to provide disa-
bled employees with new positions). 
 120 See Wernick, 91 F.3d at 384–85; Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700. 
 121 Huber II, 486 F.3d at 484 (quoting Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029). Disabled em-
ployees would be reassigned only because of their membership in a statutorily-protected class. Id. 
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statute.122 Nondiscrimination statutes ensure that members of a protected 
population are not subjected to discrimination.123 More specifically, the 
ADA’s nondiscrimination requirements bar employers from relying on disa-
bility-related prejudices in making employment decisions.124 Nondiscrimina-
tion statutes, unlike affirmative action statutes, are not designed to provide 
members of statutorily-protected populations with preferential treatment as a 
means of remedying the effects of past discrimination.125 In the words of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, “the ADA operates as a shield 
against discrimination; the statute is not a sword used to punish non-disabled 
workers.”126 Thus, courts that view the ADA as a nondiscrimination statute 
reason that using the reassignment clause to grant disabled persons preferen-
tial treatment would pervert the purpose of the law.127 
Additionally, two U.S. Courts of Appeals have relied upon U.S. Airways 
to conclude that the ADA only affords disabled employees the opportunity to 
compete for vacant positions.128 In 2002, just months after the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in U.S. Airways, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, in Mays v. Principi, reasoned that an employer’s policy of providing 
vacant positions to the most qualified employees is similar to an employer’s 
policy of awarding vacant positions to the most senior employees.129 The 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See Terrell, 132 F.3d at 627 (reasoning that the ADA was not designed to eliminate dis-
crimination against disabled persons and replace it with discrimination against nondisabled per-
sons); Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700 (stating that the ADA only prohibits employment discrimination 
against disabled persons and does not grant disabled persons preferential treatment). The U.S 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also suggests that the language of the ADA itself indi-
cates that the Act is a nondiscrimination statute. See Terrell, 132 F.3d at 627 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(a)(8) (2012)) (finding that “the Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabili-
ties are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals”). 
 123 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (prohibiting employers from discriminating on the 
basis of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 4948 (3d ed. 1992) (defining nondiscrimination as the 
“absence of discrimination” or as “the practice or policy of refraining from discrimination”). 
 124 See Bagenstos, supra note 58, at 828. 
 125 See Befort, supra note 29, at 456 (noting that preferential treatment “cuts against the equal 
treatment model reflected in most anti-discrimination statutes”); see also Peter H. Schuck, Affirm-
ative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 5 (2002) (distinguishing the 
concepts of affirmative action and nondiscrimination).  
 126 Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 356. 
 127 See id. at 355 (quoting Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 
1998)) (stating that noncompetitive reassignments would transform a nondiscrimination statute 
into a mandatory preference statute and that this would be incompatible with the non-
discriminatory goals of the Act); see also Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700 (indicating that the ADA only 
prohibits employment discrimination and does not require affirmative action). 
 128 See Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483–84; Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2002), 
abrogated by United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 129 See 301 F.3d at 872. Because the plaintiff worked for a federal agency and not a private 
employer, she brought her disability discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 868. 
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Seventh Circuit noted that because the facts aligned closely with the facts of 
U.S. Airways, the reasoning and logic of U.S. Airways was directly applica-
ble.130 In short, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that if an employer does not 
have to make exceptions to its seniority policy, an employer should not have 
to make exceptions to its policy of awarding job vacancies to the most quali-
fied employees.131 
In 2007, in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Huber II), the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also held that U.S. Airways does not support 
noncompetitive reassignments.132 For the Huber II court, allowing disabled 
employees to circumvent an employer’s policy of hiring the most qualified 
candidates is just as problematic as allowing a disabled employee to circum-
vent a seniority system.133 Exceptions to either of these policies grant disa-
bled employees preferential treatment at the expense of nondisabled employ-
ees or applicants, which the Huber II court reasoned was not Congress’s in-
tent when it enacted the ADA.134 
B. If All Other Options Fail, a Disabled Employee Must  
Receive a Vacant Position  
On the opposite side of the circuit split, three U.S. Courts of Appeals 
have held—and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) has determined—that disabled employees are entitled to noncom-
                                                                                                                           
As discussed above, cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act are persuasive authority for analyz-
ing the ADA. Brookes, supra note 51, at 864; see supra note 51 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the use of Rehabilitation Act cases in ADA claims). 
 130 See Mays, 301 F.3d at 872. The plaintiff, a nurse at a Veterans Administration hospital, 
suffered a permanent injury to her back while helping lift a 400 pound patient. Id. at 868. The 
hospital reassigned the plaintiff to a clerical support position that did not involve heavy lifting but 
also paid a much lower salary. Id. The plaintiff argued that the hospital should have allowed her to 
continue to work as a nurse, but without lifting responsibilities, or reassigned her to an administrative 
nursing position. Id. at 870. 
 131 See id. at 872. In 2012 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that U.S. 
Airways supports noncompetitive reassignments, thereby abrogating the Mays decision. United 
Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764 (stating that the Mays court incorrectly determined that violating best-
qualified reassignment policies always constitutes an undue hardship); see infra notes 147–154 
(discussing the Seventh Circuit’s departure from Mays in its 2012 United Airlines decision). 
 132 See 486 F.3d at 483–84. Like Mays, the facts of Huber II bore a close resemblance to the 
facts of U.S. Airways. See id. at 481; see also supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (outlining the 
facts of Huber II). 
 133 See Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483–84 (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. 
Airways supports requiring disabled employees to compete with nondisabled employees when an 
employer maintains a nondiscriminatory policy of granting reassignments to the most qualified 
candidates). 
 134 See id. at 484 (quoting Kellogg v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 233 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 
2000)) (per curiam) (stating that “an employer is not required to make accommodations that would 
subvert other, more qualified applicants for the job”). 
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petitive reassignments to vacant positions as a reasonable accommodation.135 
In these jurisdictions, disabled employees are entitled to automatic reassign-
ment to vacant positions without competing against qualified nondisabled 
candidates.136 This means that employers must fill vacant positions with qual-
ified disabled employees if no other accommodations would allow the em-
ployees to continue performing their essential job functions.137 
These courts reason that disabled employees are entitled to more than an 
opportunity to compete for reassignments because holding otherwise would 
render the ADA’s reassignment clause meaningless.138 The D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals noted that the central provision of the ADA bars employers from 
discriminating against the disabled “in regard to job application proce-
dures.”139 This alone provides employees with an opportunity to compete.140 
The ADA, however, went further by requiring employers to reassign disabled 
employees to vacant positions.141 To hold otherwise, according to the D.C. 
Circuit Court, would make the ADA’s reassignment clause “redundant.”142 
Apart from these statutory interpretations, the EEOC has also deter-
mined that the reassignment clause mandates noncompetitive reassign-
ments.143 In its 2002 enforcement guidance, the EEOC stated that a qualified 
disabled employee must be reassigned to a vacant position if no other ac-
commodation would allow the disabled employee to continue to perform the 
                                                                                                                           
 135 United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764–65 (holding that disabled employees are entitled to non-
competitive reassignments as a reasonable accommodation); Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1166 
(same); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305 (same); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *23. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, has questioned whether the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Aka truly supports noncompetitive reassignments. Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483 n.2 (as-
serting that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Aka only requires employers to do more than allow disa-
bled employees to apply for reassignments but does not expressly condone noncompetitive reas-
signments); see also Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305 (declining to decide the exact boundaries of an em-
ployer’s reassignment duties). 
 136 See United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764–65; Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1166; Aka 156 F.3d 
at 1305; see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *23. 
 137 See United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764–65; Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1169; Aka 156 F.3d 
at 1305; see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *23. 
 138 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167 (stating that the ADA’s promise of reasonable ac-
commodation is “empty” if an employer is only required to consider a disabled employee’s appli-
cation for reassignment); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (noting that other sections of the ADA already 
require employers to allow disabled employees to compete for reassignments); see also Dorsey, 
supra note 107, at 460–62 (discussing textualist arguments made by courts in favor of mandatory 
reassignments). 
 139 Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012)). 
 140 See id. (indicating that 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) already permits disabled employees to apply 
for reassignments). 
 141 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (including reassignment as a possible reasonable accommo-
dation); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (stating that reassignment involves “active effort on the part of the 
employer”). 
 142 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304. 
 143 EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *23. 
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essential functions of his or her position.144 Therefore, a disabled employee 
does not merely have the ability to compete for vacant positions, but is in-
stead given priority.145 The enforcement guidance also notes that disabled 
employees are already able to compete for vacant positions without any statu-
tory entitlements.146 
Prior to 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held 
that disabled employees are not entitled to noncompetitive reassignments as a 
reasonable accommodation.147 In 2012, however, in EEOC v. United Airlines, 
Inc., the Seventh Circuit departed from precedent and held that disabled em-
ployees are entitled to noncompetitive reassignments as a reasonable accom-
modation.148 The Seventh Circuit stated that its previous decision in Mays 
misinterpreted U.S. Airways and that the U.S. Supreme Court decision actual-
ly provided support for noncompetitive reassignments.149 As the United Air-
lines court emphasized, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the ADA some-
times requires employers to provide disabled employees with preferential 
treatment.150 The fact that a reassignment allows a disabled employee to 
break a rule that other nondisabled employees must follow does not per se 
make the reassignment unreasonable or an undue hardship.151 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Id. at *20. 
 145 Id. at *23 (“Reassignment means that the employee gets the vacant position if s/he is qual-
ified for it.”). The EEOC indicated that any other interpretation would make reassignments of 
“little value.” Id. Reading the ADA to only provide disabled employees with the opportunity to 
compete for reassignments “nullifies” the reassignment clause. Id. at *23 n.90. 
 146 Id. at *23 n.90 (“Even without the ADA, an employee with a disability may have the right 
to compete for a vacant position.”). 
 147 Mays, 301 F.3d at 872, abrogated by EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th 
Cir. 2012); Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029, overruled by United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 
(7th Cir. 2012); see supra notes 129–131 and accompanying text (discussing the Mays decision). 
In 2000, in EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held 
that employers maintaining best-qualified reassignment policies are not required to reassign disabled 
employees to vacant positions if there are more qualified nondisabled candidates seeking the same 
positions. 227 F.3d at 1029. The court reasoned that the ADA is a “nondiscrimination statute” and not 
a “mandatory preference act.” Id. at 1028 (quoting Dalton, 141 F.3d at 669). The court described 
noncompetitive reassignments as “affirmative action with a vengeance” because they involve giving 
a job to someone merely because of his or her inclusion in a statutorily protected group. Id. at 1029. 
Noncompetitive reassignments were problematic for the court because they do more than simply 
allow disabled employees to compete in the workplace. Id. Though the Seventh Circuit overruled this 
decision in United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 761, the Humiston-Keeling court’s reasoning is identical to 
the reasoning of courts that prohibit any preferential treatment for disabled employees. See Humis-
ton-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028–29, overruled by United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 
2012); Terrell, 132 F.3d at 627; Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700. 
 148 693 F.3d at 764–65. 
 149 Id. (stating that the Mays court mistakenly concluded that a best-qualified selection policy 
is the equivalent of a seniority system and will therefore be unreasonable in the run of cases). 
 150 Id. at 763 (quoting U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 397) (determining that “preferences will 
sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal opportunity goal”). 
 151 See id. at 764 (stating that the U.S. Airways analysis must be used to determine if noncom-
petitive reassignment would be either reasonable or an undue hardship). 
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After departing from Mays, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit instructed the lower court to apply the U.S. Airways multi-step 
framework.152 Although the case was technically remanded for the district 
court to apply the framework, the Seventh Circuit also indicated what it be-
lieved to be the proper result of the analysis.153 According to the United Air-
lines court, the Seventh Circuit must join the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Tenth and D.C. Circuits and hold that the ADA mandates noncompetitive re-
assignments as long as they do not create an undue hardship.154 
III. A REASSIGNMENT REALIGNMENT: SHIFTING BACK TO  
CONGRESS’S ORIGINAL INTENT 
Requiring noncompetitive reassignments prevents employers from dis-
criminating against disabled employees and gives meaning to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act’s (“ADA”) reassignment clause.155 Although a system 
requiring disabled employees to compete with nondisabled employees may 
appear fair, it becomes easy for employers to avoid reassigning disabled em-
ployees under the pretext of hiring more qualified employees.156 Moreover, 
both the text of the ADA itself and its legislative history indicate that the Act 
was intended to provide limited preferential treatment to disabled employ-
ees.157 Existing statutory limitations and administrative regulations provide an 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Id.; see U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 401–02, 405. 
 153 United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764–65. 
 154 Id. (“Two of our sister Circuits have already determined that the ADA requires employers 
to appoint disabled employees to vacant positions, provided that such accommodations would not 
create an undue hardship . . . . [I]n light of [U.S. Airways] . . . we must adopt a similar approach.”). 
Because it adopted the U.S. Airways analysis, the United Airlines court must have determined that 
making an exception to a competitive disability-neutral employment process was either reasonable 
on its face or reasonable in this particular situation and was not an undue hardship to the employ-
er. See U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 401–02, 405; United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764–65. 
 155 See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999) (“If a disabled 
employee had only a right to require the employer to consider his application for reassignment but 
had no right to reassignment itself, even if the consideration revealed that the reassignment would 
be reasonable, then [the reassignment clause’s] promise within the ADA would be empty.”); Stacy 
M. Hickox, Transfer as an Accommodation: Standards from Discrimination Cases and Theory, 62 
ARK. L. REV. 195, 222–24 (2009) (discussing the difficulties disabled employees face when em-
ployers are allowed to grant reassignments to more qualified nondisabled employees). 
 156 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167 (noting that employers could go through the motions 
of considering disabled employees’ applications for reassignment and then deny each of them); 
Hickox, supra note 155, at 223 (arguing that it is easy for employers to deny disabled employees 
accommodations on the basis of insufficient qualifications). 
 157 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (requiring employers to provide reasonable ac-
commodations); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 57–58 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
303, 339–40 (discussing the reasonable accommodation requirement); John E. Murray & Christo-
pher J. Murray, Enabling the Disabled: Reassignment and the ADA, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 721, 742 
(2000) (recognizing that the only way to be “faithful to the language of the ADA, and its legisla-
tive history” is to uphold noncompetitive reassignments). 
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effective method of minimizing the reassignment clause’s negative impact on 
nondisabled employees.158 Furthermore, reassigning disabled employees can 
indirectly benefit society by reducing federal disability spending.159 
A congressional amendment would be the best avenue for remedying the 
circuit split in favor of noncompetitive reassignments because it is feasible 
and the result would be definitive.160 Even if Congress does not revisit the 
ADA’s reassignment clause, courts should interpret the ADA to require non-
competitive reassignments, and can do so within the framework outlined by 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.161 
Section A of this Part argues that the ADA intended to provide disabled em-
ployees with limited preferential treatment in the form of reasonable accom-
modations.162 Section A also discusses how the ADA’s provisions and the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) regulations 
curb the adverse impact reassignments have on nondisabled employees as 
well as the potential for noncompetitive reassignments to reduce federal disa-
                                                                                                                           
 158 See 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A) (establishing the undue hardship affirmative defense); 
Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1170 (noting that Congress has substantially restricted the duty to 
reassign disabled employees); Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (en banc) (stating that existing restrictions on the reassignment clause reduce the amount of 
disruption connected to reassignments); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra, note 74, at *20–23 
(placing unique restrictions on the reassignment clause). 
 159 See Castro v. Child Psychiatry Ctr., No. 96-6241, 1997 WL 141860, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 
1997) (noting that the purpose of reasonable accommodations is to prevent disabled employees from 
becoming unemployed); John Merline, The Sharp Rise in Disability Claims: Are Federal Disability 
Benefits Becoming a General Safety Net?, REGION FOCUS, Second/Third Quarter 2012, 24, at 24–25 
(observing that an increase in the nation’s unemployment rate can lead to an increase in applications 
for federal disability benefits); Avik Roy, How Americans Game the $200 Billion-a-Year ‘Disability-
Industrial Complex,’ FORBES.COM (Apr. 8 2013 2:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/the
apothecary/2013/04/08/how-americans-game-the-200-billion-a-year-disability-industrial-complex/, ar 
chived at http://perma.cc/CD2C-3JJS (discussing a strong connection between unemployment and 
applying for Social Security Disability Insurance). 
 160 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that laws passed by Congress “shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land”); Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213) (demonstrating that Congress was willing to extend disa-
bility discrimination protection through the passage of the ADA in 1990); ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213) 
(demonstrating that Congress was willing to revisit the ADA in 2008); see also Nicole B. Porter, 
Reasonable Burdens: Resolving the Conflict Between Disabled Employees and Their Coworkers, 
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 335–36 (2007) (proposing that Congress amend the ADA’s reasona-
ble accommodation requirement). 
 161 See U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401–02, 405 (2002) (providing a frame-
work for determining if an accommodation is both reasonable and not unduly burdensome); see, 
e.g., EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 764–65 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
2734 (2013) (urging the lower court to apply the U.S. Airways framework and hold that noncom-
petitive reassignments are reasonable in the run of cases on remand). 
 162 See infra notes 165–186 and accompanying text. 
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bility spending.163 Section B then offers several methods of remedying the 
circuit split in favor of noncompetitive reassignments.164 
A. Reasonable Accommodations: Fighting Discrimination Through  
Limited Preferential Treatment 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals that do not support any preferential treat-
ment for disabled employees seeking reassignment mistakenly reason that the 
ADA must be either a nondiscrimination statute or an affirmative action stat-
ute.165 Properly understood, however, the ADA is a nondiscrimination statute 
that also grants limited preferential treatment through its reasonable accom-
modation requirement.166 The ADA contains provisions that both prohibit 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See infra notes 187–202 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 203–225 and accompanying text. 
 165 See EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that granting pref-
erential treatment to disabled employees would “convert a nondiscrimination statute into a manda-
tory preference statute”); Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that prefer-
ential treatment for disabled employees would turn the ADA’s “nondiscrimination into discrimi-
nation”); see also Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167 (counseling against confusing the ADA’s 
definition of discrimination with affirmative action). But see U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 397 (de-
termining that “preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal op-
portunity goal”). These courts offer little reasoning to justify their holdings that the ADA is not an 
affirmative action statute that does not grant preferential treatment. See Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care 
Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 459 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding in two sentences that the disabled plaintiff 
was not entitled to preferential treatment); Terrell, 132 F.3d at 627 (concluding in one sentence 
that the ADA does not provide disabled employees with preferential treatment); Wernick v. Fed. 
Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384–85 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding, without prior reasoning, that 
an employer does not have an affirmative duty to provide a disabled employee with a reassign-
ment). In lieu of articulating their own theory, these courts refer to what appears to be the first case to 
hold that the ADA is not an affirmative action statute, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s 
1995 decision of Daugherty v. City of El Paso. See, e.g., Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 459 (citing Daugherty 
v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995)); Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d at 354 (same); 
Terrell, 132 F.3d at 627 (same). This lack of analysis is especially problematic because the Daugh-
erty court itself did little to explain why the ADA is not an affirmative action statute. See Daugherty, 
56 F.3d at 700. The Fifth Circuit opinion only devoted two sentences to its holding that the ADA 
is not an affirmative action statute. See id. (“[W]e do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative 
action in favor of individuals with disabilities . . . . It prohibits employment discrimination against 
qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and no less.”). 
 166 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (prohibiting covered entities from discriminating against 
qualified individuals on the basis of disability); id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (providing the reasonable 
accommodation requirement); see Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the 
Deck? The “Unfair Advantage” Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 
962 (2000) (arguing that “nondiscrimination requires more than passively avoiding bias”); see 
also Bagenstos, supra note 58, at 837–38 (explaining that anti-discrimination provisions and ac-
commodation provisions both seek to remedy “a pattern of social and economic subordination that 
has intolerable effects on our society”). Preferential treatment is a more accurate term than affirm-
ative action because, as many legal scholars suggest, affirmative action and reasonable accommo-
dation are two distinct concepts that should not be confused with each other. See Carlos A. Ball, 
Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 973–81 (2004) (outlining the differences between reasonable accom-
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discrimination as well as provisions that entitle disabled persons to certain 
workplace accommodations.167  
Putting aside these efforts to label the ADA, analyzing the ADA’s text 
and legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to provide limited 
preferential treatment, like noncompetitive reassignments, to disabled em-
ployees.168 As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned, the reassignment 
clause must grant disabled employees more than just the privilege of compet-
ing for vacant positions because other provisions of the ADA already prohibit 
treating disabled employees differently than nondisabled employees.169 The 
reassignment clause would thus be reduced to a statutory redundancy if it on-
ly required employers to treat disabled employees like nondisabled employ-
ees or applicants.170 Indeed, it would be disingenuous to claim that employees 
                                                                                                                           
modation and affirmative action); Befort, supra note 29, at 469 (arguing that “affirmative action 
rhetoric has clouded [the reassignment] debate”); Note, Toward Reasonable Equality: Accommo-
dating Learning Disabilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1560, 
1574 (1998) (reasoning that comparing the ADA to affirmative action is a “misplaced” analogy). 
 167 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (stating that employers are prohibited from “limiting, segre-
gating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities 
or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee”); 
id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (stating that employers must provide reasonable accommodations for the 
physical and mental limitations of disabled employees); see also Befort & Donesky, supra note 
52, at 1047–48 (arguing that the ADA, unlike most anti-discrimination laws, not only bans dis-
crimination but also requires employers to make reasonable accommodations). 
 168 See 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A) (providing the reasonable accommodation requirement); 
id. § 12111(9)(B) (providing the reassignment clause); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 68 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350 (stating that the only time an employer can avoid 
providing a reasonable accommodation is when the accommodation would create an undue hard-
ship); see also U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 397 (determining that “preferences will sometimes prove 
necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal opportunity goal”); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (noting that 
the text of the ADA supports granting preferential treatment to disabled employees); Barbara A. 
Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Limitations of 
Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 201, 212 (1993) (arguing that the 
ADA does not afford disabled employees preferential treatment, but conceding that the law does 
provide them with expansive reasonable accommodations). 
 169 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)); see also Murray & Murray, su-
pra note 157, at 742 (arguing that forcing disabled employees to compete for reassignments “evis-
cerates the accommodation and reassignment provisions of the ADA,” leaving only a general 
prohibition against discrimination). 
 170 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1164–65 (stating that if the reassignment clause only re-
quires employers to consider disabled employees on an equal basis with nondisabled employees, 
then the clause adds nothing to employers’ existing obligations under the ADA); Aka, 156 F.3d at 
1304 (stating that the reassignment clause “would be redundant if permission to apply [for job 
vacancies] were all it meant”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (providing the reassignment 
clause). This redundancy is unacceptable because a primary rule of statutory interpretation is that 
every word and phrase is presumed to add some meaning to the statute. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of 
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 669 (2007) (cautioning against “reading a 
text in a way that makes part of it redundant” or “mere surplusage”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 364 (2000) (stating that the “cardinal principle” of statutory interpretation is to give meaning 
to every word and phrase of a statute). 
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who take the initiative and successfully obtain vacant positions through com-
petitive processes have been “reassigned.”171 
Furthermore, barring noncompetitive reassignments would dramatically 
alter the Act’s primary operative clause, which states that “[n]o covered entity 
shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.”172 
If disabled employees are required to compete with nondisabled employees, 
this provision will effectively be changed to not discriminating against the 
“best qualified individual, notwithstanding the disability.”173 This rewriting of 
the ADA by courts that do not interpret the Act to mandate noncompetitive 
reassignment replaces the clear policy preferences of Congress and should 
therefore be rejected.174 
In addition to textual support, the ADA’s legislative history also encour-
ages promoting the economic opportunities of disabled persons through pref-
erential treatment in the reassignment process.175 This legislative history 
states that the objective of the ADA is to “provide a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities 
and to bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social main-
                                                                                                                           
 171 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1164 (asserting that the word “reassignment” suggests 
some active effort from the employer and that a narrower definition of reassignment would do 
“violence to the literal meaning of the word”); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (indicating that the core 
word “assign” implies some active effort from the employer). 
 172 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012); see Dorsey, supra note 107, at 462 (arguing that requiring 
disabled employees to compete for reassignments would be the equivalent of a “judicial amend-
ment” to what Congress initially enacted). 
 173 Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167–68. 
 174 See Dorsey, supra note 107, at 462 (arguing that this interpretation of the reassignment 
clause should be avoided because the courts have “a duty to enforce the ADA as Congress wrote 
it”). Courts are distinct from legislatures and do not have the authority to amend statutory text. See 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (observing that the U.S. Supreme Court is not 
a “super-legislature” designed “to determine the wisdom” of statutes); Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494, 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (1951) (stating that, because courts are composed 
of unelected individuals, they are not the best institution to make policy judgments for a democrat-
ic society); William W. Bierce, Ltd. v. Hutchins, 205 U.S. 340, 347 (1907) (observing that courts 
are not legislatures and therefore cannot create new regulations). 
 175 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 22, 68, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304, 350; see 
Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1169 (concluding that competitive reassignments are unsupported by 
either the ADA’s statutory language or its legislative history and is instead just “judicial gloss”); 
Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (using the ADA’s legislative history to reason that the Act provides prefer-
ential treatment to disabled employees through reasonable accommodations). Although the legis-
lative history indicates that employers are not required to “prefer” disabled applicants over non-
disabled applicants, the legislative history also indicates that reasonable accommodations for 
disabled employees are required. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 56, 
63, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 338, 345). Employers are not, however, required to modify the essen-
tial functions of the employee’s position. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 64, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 346 (stating that the ADA does not require employers to make any changes to 
job descriptions or policies if doing so would dramatically alter the essential functions of the jobs). 
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stream of American life.”176 To accomplish this goal, according to the legisla-
tive history, the ADA requires employers to do more to accommodate disa-
bled employees than Title VII requires employers to do to accommodate the 
religious beliefs of employees.177 Unlike accommodations for religious be-
liefs, reasonable accommodations for disabled employees must be provided if 
they would not cause undue hardship for the employer.178 
Additionally, if Congress was concerned with the adverse consequences 
of noncompetitive reassignments, broader restrictions could have been estab-
lished for the reassignment clause.179 For example, the legislative history 
states that “reassignment need only be to a vacant position” and “‘bumping’ 
another employee out of a position to create a vacancy is not required.”180 By 
protecting current employees from being “bumped” to create new vacancies, 
Congress clearly considered and applied protections to nondisabled workers 
from reassignments.181 Had Congress also wanted to ensure that nondisabled 
workers were not affected in the filling of new vacancies through the non-
competitive reassignment of disabled workers, it could have similarly stated 
that employers are not required to pass over more qualified candidates in ei-
ther the legislative history or the statute itself.182 Because Congress failed to 
                                                                                                                           
 176 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 22, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304. This objective is similar to 
the goals listed in the ADA itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2012); supra note 11 and accom-
panying text (listing the ADA’s goals). 
 177 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 68, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350. 
 178 See id. (stating that, although Title VII only requires employers to make religious accom-
modations if they impose minimal cost, the ADA requires employers to make disability accom-
modations unless they would impose “significant difficulty or expense”); see also Eckles v. Con-
sol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1049 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the ADA’s reasonable accommo-
dation requirement is not identical to the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964). 
 179 See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (stating that Congress has the ability to 
determine who may enforce statutory rights and in what manner they may be enforced); see also 
Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1170 (providing a summary of the statutory limitations placed on the 
reassignment clause and indicating that any additional limitations “must come from Congress”). 
 180 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345; see White v. York Int’l 
Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 362 (10th Cir. 1995) (indicating that the ADA does not require employers to 
reassign disabled employees to positions that are already occupied by other employees); Eckles, 
94 F.3d at 1047 (noting that because reassignments must be to vacant positions, Congress could 
not have intended for nondisabled employees to lose their jobs to accommodate disabled employ-
ees). 
 181 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345. 
 182 Compare 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (requiring employers to provide reasonable 
accommodations to disabled employees), and id. § 12111(9)(B) (requiring employers to, at times, 
provide reassignments to vacant positions), with Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(j) (2012) (asserting that employers are not required to provide any form of preferential 
treatment to an individual due to the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). 
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include this reciprocal language, it presumably intended the ADA to provide 
noncompetitive reassignments.183 
Furthermore, when the Rehabilitation Act—the ADA’s predecessor— 
was enacted in 1973, it did not require employers to consider reassign-
ments.184 Although Congress used the Rehabilitation Act as a framework for 
the ADA, it made the deliberate decision to depart from that legislation by 
adding the reassignment clause.185 This departure strongly suggests that Con-
gress intended for the ADA to function differently than the Rehabilitation Act 
because every word of a statute is presumed to have some meaning.186 
Although the ADA’s text and the legislative history justify noncompeti-
tive reassignments, these reassignments do admittedly have some negative 
impact on nondisabled employees.187 Nonetheless, existing statutory limita-
tions help mitigate the adverse impact of noncompetitive reassignments.188 
First, like all reasonable accommodations, an employer does not have to pro-
vide a reassignment if it would create an undue hardship.189 A reassignment 
that adversely affected many nondisabled employees would likely qualify as 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (pointing out that if Congress had intended for disabled em-
ployees to be treated like nondisabled job applicants, it would have been unnecessary for the legis-
lative history to explain that “bumping” a nondisabled employee from his or her position to pro-
duce a vacancy is not required by the Act); Dorsey, supra note 107, at 464 (arguing that if reas-
signments are not mandatory, Congress would have had no reason to explain that employers are 
not required to “bump” nondisabled employees to create vacancies). 
 184 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 701–796 (2012)); see Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (indicating that em-
ployers only have to consider reassignment if they normally maintain a policy of reassigning em-
ployees). The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to include a reassignment requirement. See 
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, §§ 503 & 505, 106 Stat. 4344, 
4424, 4428 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d) (2012)).  
 185 Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–794 (1976) (lacking a reassignment clause), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(9)(B) (providing the ADA’s reassignment clause). See also Befort & Donesky, supra 
note 52, at 1058 (discussing the ADA’s departure from the Rehabilitation Act). 
 186 See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (asserting that courts must 
“give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute”); Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 
112, 115, (1879) (declaring that every aspect of a statute must be construed in a way that gives 
each part of the statute meaning). 
 187 Befort, supra note 13, at 946 (discussing noncompetitive reassignments and the resulting 
negative consequences for nondisabled employees); Alex B. Long, The ADA’s Reasonable Ac-
commodation Requirement and “Innocent Third Parties,” 68 MO. L. REV. 863, 884 (2003) (argu-
ing that the reassignment clause creates a “substantial” conflict between disabled and nondisabled 
employees); see also Aka, 156 F. 3d at 1314–15 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (arguing against non-
competitive reassignments because accommodations should not have a negative direct impact on 
nondisabled employees). 
 188 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (establishing the undue hardship affirmative de-
fense); id. § 12111(10) (defining undue hardship); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305 (discussing the limita-
tions the ADA places on reasonable accommodations). 
 189 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A) (establishing the undue hardship affirmative defense); see 
supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text (discussing the undue hardship exception to the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodation requirement). 
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an undue hardship because it would involve “significant difficulty or ex-
pense.”190 Employers also have no reassignment obligation when disabled 
employees are unqualified for vacant positions.191 A disabled employee must 
meet the minimum qualifications of the vacant position and also be able to 
perform the essential functions of the vacant position either with or without 
reasonable accommodation.192 
The EEOC regulations governing the ADA further limit the reassign-
ment clause’s negative impact on nondisabled employees.193 Most important-
ly, the regulations state that reassignment is the reasonable accommodation of 
“last resort.”194 This means that a reassignment will only affect nondisabled 
employees when no other accommodations would allow a disabled employee 
to continue to perform his or her essential job functions.195 Like the ADA’s 
legislative history, the EEOC enforcement guidance also indicates that em-
ployers are not required to remove nondisabled employees from positions to 
create vacancies for disabled employees seeking reassignment.196 In short, 
because reassignments are subject to more limitations than any other type of 
reasonable accommodation, employers will use reassignments infrequently 
and the overall impact on nondisabled employees will be diminished.197 
                                                                                                                           
 190 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (defining undue hardship). 
 191 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (stating that an employer only needs to provide reasonable accom-
modations to an “otherwise qualified individual with a disability”) (emphasis added); see Cravens 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing the 
ADA’s “otherwise qualified individual with a disability” prerequisite). 
 192 See Befort, supra note 29, at 451. The EEOC enforcement guidance states that employers 
have no obligation to train disabled employees so that they may become qualified for vacant posi-
tions. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *20. 
 193 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2014); APPENDIX, supra note 74; EEOC Enforcement Guidance, 
supra note 74, *20–23; Befort, supra note 29, at 450–51 (discussing the restrictions placed on 
reassignments by the EEOC); see also supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (same). 
 194 EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *20; see Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1019 (not-
ing that “reassignment is an accommodation of last resort”); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1301 (noting that 
both Congress and the EEOC viewed reassignment as “an option to be considered only after other 
efforts at accommodation have failed”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345 (stating that a reassignment should only be considered after the employer 
makes efforts to accommodate the disabled worker in the position he or she was hired to fill); 
APPENDIX, supra note 74 (stating that “reassignment should be considered only when accommo-
dation within the individual’s current position would pose an undue hardship”). 
 195 See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *20; Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1019; Aka, 
156 F.3d at 1301. 
 196 EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *21; see also See H.R. REP. NO. 101-
485(II), at 63, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345. 
 197 See Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1019–20 (providing a brief overview of the various limitations 
on the reassignment clause); Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1170–78 (discussing, in detail, the nu-
merous limitations on reassignments); APPENDIX, supra note 74 (discussing several restrictions 
that apply to the reassignment clause); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *20–23 
(explaining the unique restrictions on the reassignment clause). 
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Furthermore, noncompetitive reassignments have the potential to indi-
rectly benefit nondisabled employees by reducing government spending.198 In 
2002, the federal government spent $229 billion dollars on benefits for disa-
bled Americans.199 Only six years later, that number jumped to $357 billion 
dollars, which represented twelve percent of the entire federal budget.200 Disa-
bled persons are more likely to apply for federal disability benefits if they are 
unemployed.201 Every successful reassignment of a disabled employee ensures 
                                                                                                                           
 198 Roy, supra note 159 (discussing a strong connection between unemployment and applying 
for Social Security Disability Insurance); Estella J. Schoen, Note, Does the ADA Make Exceptions 
in a Unionized Workplace? The Conflict Between the Reassignment Provision of the ADA and 
Collectively Bargained Seniority Systems, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1394–95 (1998) (noting that 
Congress enacted the ADA to increase employment among disabled persons). Apart from indirect 
financial benefits, noncompetitive reassignments may provide other hidden benefits to nondisa-
bled employees. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 
841–42 (explaining that many accommodations, such as wheel chair ramps or elevators, benefit 
both disabled persons and nondisabled persons). As the accommodation of last resort, reassign-
ments can sometimes be necessary to prevent nondisabled employees from losing the opportunity 
to work with productive disabled employees. See id., at 853 (discussing relational benefits, which 
are the “benefits of having a particular individual, with her particular skills and talents, in the 
workplace”). 
 199 Gina Livermore et al., Health Care Costs Are a Key Driver of Growth in Federal and State 
Assistance to Working-Age People with Disabilities, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1664, 1666 (2011); DAVID 
STAPLETON & GINA LIVERMORE, CTR. FOR STUDYING DISABILITY POLICY, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 11-03, 
COSTS, CUTS, AND CONSEQUENCES: CHARTING A NEW COURSE FOR WORKING-AGE PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES 2 (2011), available at http://www.researchondisability.org/docs/default-document-li-
brary/working-agepeople_ib.pdf?sfvrsn=2, archived at http://perma.cc/AF86-7HPT. As of 2003, these 
monies were allocated to over two hundred programs and more than twenty federal agencies. David 
A. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 47, 49 (2009). 
 200 Livermore et al., supra note 199, at 1665; STAPLETON & LIVERMORE, supra note 199, at 1, 
2. This jump represented a 56.3% increase in spending. STAPLETON & LIVERMORE, supra note 199, 
at 2. Additionally, in 2008, states spent seventy-one billion dollars on joint federal-state programs for 
disabled Americans. Id. at 1. As of 2013, approximately fourteen million Americans received a disa-
bility check from the government each month. Chana Joffe-Walt, Unfit for Work: The Startling Rise 
of Disability in America, NPR: PLANET MONEY, http://apps.npr.org/unfit-for-work/#fn1, archived at 
http://perma.cc/LAN2-6FQU (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 201 See Merline, supra note 159, at 25 (discussing how the 2008 economic recession led to a 
sharp rise in disability benefits applicants); Joffe-Walt, supra note 200 (explaining that the “vast 
majority” of Americans receiving federal disability benefits are unemployed). In 2011, the eco-
nomic recession caused an additional 3,000 Americans to apply for disability benefits each month. 
See Merline, supra note 159, at 25. Disabled persons are also at a disproportionate risk of being 
unemployed. See Economic News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 
A-6: Employment Status of the Civilian Population by Sex, Age, and Disability Status, Not Sea-
sonally Adjusted (Oct. 3, 2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t06.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AG6F-2KGU (stating that for September 2014, the unemployment rate 
for nondisabled persons over the age of fifteen was 5.5% and the unemployment rate for disabled 
persons over the age of fifteen was 12.3%); Marta Russell, Backlash, the Political Economy, and 
Structural Exclusion, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335, 340 (2000) (citing a Harris survey 
indicating that in 1998 only 29% of disabled working age persons were employed, whereas 79% 
of nondisabled working age persons were employed). Despite these findings, disabled employees 
may be some of the hardest workers. See Americans with Disabilities May Be the Best Workers No 
One’s Hiring, SALON (Aug. 7, 2013, 9:20 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/08/07/americans_with_
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that there is one less person who is out of work and therefore one less person 
seeking to collect these taxpayer-funded benefits.202 
B. Implementing Noncompetitive Reassignments: Solving the Problem 
Through Congressional Amendment or U.S. Airways v. Barnett  
Although the existing EEOC enforcement guidance supports noncom-
petitive reassignments of disabled persons, it has been ineffective at protect-
ing disabled employees.203 As the circuit split over the reassignment clause 
and best-qualified reassignment policies illustrates, federal courts frequently 
do not defer to the EEOC’s enforcement guidance concerning reassignments 
of disabled employees.204 Therefore, in light of the ineffectiveness of the 
EEOC enforcement guidance, alternative methods of implementing noncom-
petitive reassignments should be explored.205 The most promising alternatives 
                                                                                                                           
disabilities_may_be_the_best_workers_who_cant_get_jobs_newscred/, archived at http://perma.cc/
V86E-UFU4 (reporting that, since 2007, Walgreens has hired a large number of disabled workers 
because they are more efficient and loyal than nondisabled workers). See generally NAT’L GOV-
ERNORS ASS’N, A BETTER BOTTOM LINE: EMPLOYING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (2013), avail-
able at https://governor.delaware.gov/docs/NGA_2013_Better_Bottom_Line.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/9MZ3-W2KT (providing governors with a framework to help local businesses utilize the 
largely untapped potential of the disabled work force). 
 202 See Merline, supra note 159, at 25; see also Befort, supra note 29, at 469 (observing that 
because reassignment is the accommodation of last resort, a disabled employee who is denied a reas-
signment will be out of a job). Although reassignments may be able to help taxpayers indirectly, 
employers may also benefit financially from reassignments. See HEATHER BOUSHEY & SARAH JANE 
GLYNN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT COSTS TO REPLACING EMPLOYEES 1 
(2012), available at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/CostofTurnover.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3S66-5YGS (estimating that it costs employers approximately one fifth of 
a departing employee’s salary to train a replacement employee).  
 203 See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Huber II), 486 F.3d 480, 483–84 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(making no mention of the EEOC’s enforcement guidance and holding that the ADA requires 
noncompetitive reassignments); Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 459 (making no mention of the EEOC’s 
enforcement guidance and holding that the ADA never provides preferential treatment). The 
EEOC enforcement guidance is not controlling authority and thus not entitled to deference under 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
See Wern, supra note 74, at 1535 n.9 (stating that the EEOC’s enforcement guidance is entitled to 
only a small amount of deference); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 899 
n.3 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that the EEOC interpretative guidance, which was attached as an 
appendix to the formal regulations, does not carry the force of law). Therefore, the enforcement 
guidance should only be followed to the extent that it is persuasive. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125, 141–42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (stat-
ing that although interpretative rulings may not be controlling authority they do “constitute a body 
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guid-
ance”). 
 204 See Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483; Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 459; Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 355; Ter-
rell, 132 F.3d at 627; Wernick, 91 F.3d at 384–85; Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700. 
 205 See Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483; Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 459; Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 355; Ter-
rell, 132 F.3d at 627; Wernick, 91 F.3d at 384–85; Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700. 
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are a congressional amendment or working within the current U.S. Airways v. 
Barnett framework.206 
Congressional action is the best method of implementing noncompeti-
tive reassignments for disabled persons because it is both definitive and fea-
sible.207 If Congress were to remove the ambiguity surrounding the reassign-
ment clause, the circuit split would be resolved.208 Moreover, the ADA’s leg-
islative history indicates that Congress never intended to place tight re-
strictions on the reassignment clause.209 Therefore, Congress should amend 
the reassignment clause to more accurately reflect its intent.210 Additionally, 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 401–02, 405; see also infra notes 207–225 and accompany-
ing text (discussing either adopting a congressional amendment or operating within the U.S. Air-
ways v. Barnett framework). One prominent example of a congressional amendment to an anti-
discrimination statute is the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which amended Title VII to 
allow an employee who has suffered discrimination in compensation to sue his or her employee 
within 180 days of receiving the last discriminatory paycheck. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (2009) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2012)). 
See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. 
L. REV. 499, 554 (2010) (recounting Ledbetter’s unsuccessful sex discrimination claim and the 
resulting congressional amendment). 
 207 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that laws passed by Congress “shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land”); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)) (demonstrating that Congress was will-
ing to extend disability discrimination protection through the passage of the ADA in 1990); ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12101–12213) (demonstrating that Congress was willing to revisit the ADA in 2008); see also 
Porter, supra note 160, at 335–36 (2007) (proposing that Congress amend the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodation requirement). 
 208 Compare Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483 (holding that disabled employees are not entitled to 
noncompetitive reassignments as a reasonable accommodation), with United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 
764–65 (holding that disabled employees are entitled to noncompetitive reassignments as a rea-
sonable accommodation), Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1166–67 (same), and Aka, 156 F.3d at 
1304–05 (same). 
 209 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345. The legis-
lative history only places two restrictions on the reassignment clause. Id. First, a reassignment 
should only be made after “[efforts] . . . to accommodate [the] employee in the position that he or 
she was hired to fill.” Id. Second, the reassignment clause does not require employers to remove 
nondisabled employees from positions to create vacancies for disabled employees. Id. 
 210 See id. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 is a further indication that Congress is willing to 
amend the ADA when necessary. See Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213). Nonetheless, Congress could be unwilling to revisit the reassignment 
clause because it appears that the circuit split may be shrinking, rather than growing. See United 
Airlines, 693 F.3d 764–65 (joining the other U.S. Courts of Appeals that interpret the ADA to require 
noncompetitive reassignments). Congress may not view the reassignment clause as a major concern 
because only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explicitly holds that disabled employ-
ees are not entitled to noncompetitive reassignments. Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483. Furthermore, in the 
current political climate, it is difficult for any major federal legislation to get through Congress. See 
Tom Cohen, U.S. Government Shuts Down as Congress Can’t Agree on Spending Bill, CNN POLI-
TICS (Oct. 1, 2013, 12:43 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/30/politics/shutdown-showdown/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/6TPL-AUT6 (discussing the 2013 federal government shutdown that result-
ed from Congress’s inability to agree on a spending bill); see also Dylan Matthews, Why Congress 
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the task of restructuring the reassignment clause belongs to Congress, be-
cause it is ultimately a policy judgment.211 
The EEOC enforcement guidance interpreting the reassignment clause is 
a potential starting point for a congressional amendment.212 These guidelines 
state that “[r]eassignment means that the employee gets the vacant position if 
s/he is qualified for it” and that reassignment does not merely allow the disa-
bled employee to compete for a vacant position.213 This language should be 
incorporated directly into the text of the ADA to strengthen disabled employ-
ees’ existing reassignment right.214 Furthermore, this process of incorporating 
provisions of the enforcement guidance into the ADA could also be used to 
ensure that the interests of nondisabled employees are not forgotten.215  
If a congressional amendment is not forthcoming, it will be incumbent 
on courts to implement noncompetitive reassignments.216 Courts should apply 
                                                                                                                           
Can’t Seem to Get Anything Done, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/26/why-congress-cant-seem-to-get-anything-done/, archived at http://
perma.cc/3XJB-GCZ9 (observing that it is difficult to make changes in Congress because there are too 
many individual actors who can effectively veto legislation by withholding support).  
211 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (stating that the 
country’s elected leaders, not the U.S. Supreme Court, are entrusted with making policy judg-
ments); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court does not “sit as a super-
legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, 
business affairs, or social conditions”). 
212 See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *20–23. Congress should rely on the 
EEOC’s enforcement guidance because the EEOC, as the agency charged with implementing and 
interpreting the ADA, has the most expertise. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing 
Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008) (indicating that 
one of the primary reasons administrative agencies were established was a desire for “greater 
expertise and focus” than legislatures possessed); Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established 
by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1111, 1132 (2000) (observing that administrative agencies were created, in part, because of a 
perceived need for apolitical expertise). 
213 EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *23. 
214 See id. Incorporation is necessary because the enforcement guidance, which does not carry 
the force of law, can be circumvented. Compare id. (asserting that reassignments do not merely 
grant disabled employees the opportunity to compete for vacant positions), with Huber II, 486 
F.3d at 483 (holding that disabled employees are not entitled to noncompetitive reassignments as a 
reasonable accommodation). 
215 See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, at *20–23. One provision that could be 
incorporated to safeguard the interests of nondisabled employees states that: “Reassignment is the 
reasonable accommodation of last resort and is required only after it has been determined that: (1) 
there are no effective accommodations that will enable the employee to perform the essential func-
tions of his/her current position, or (2) all other reasonable accommodations would impose an 
undue hardship.” Id. at 20; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345 (stating that a reassignment should only be considered after the employer 
makes efforts to accommodate the disabled worker in the position he or she was hired to fill); 
APPENDIX, supra note 74 (stating that “reassignment should be considered only when accommo-
dation within the individual’s current position would pose an undue hardship”). 
 216 See United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764–65 (laying the groundwork, at a minimum, for non-
competitive reassignments); Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1166 (currently implementing noncom-
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the framework established in U.S. Airways to arrive at the conclusion that 
noncompetitive reassignments are reasonable under most circumstances.217 
Currently, there is near-universal agreement that disabled employees are not 
entitled to reassignments that violate an employer’s “legitimate non-
discriminatory policy,” such as a seniority system.218 An accommodation that 
violates a legitimate non-discriminatory policy is likely unreasonable under 
U.S. Airways because it would not be “reasonable on its face” or “in the run 
of cases.”219 Because the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have determined 
that a seniority system is a legitimate non-discriminatory policy, the Court 
held that the reassignment of a disabled person in violation of a seniority sys-
tem is generally unreasonable.220 
                                                                                                                           
petitive reassignments); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (same). Because the Huber II court relied upon a 
ruling which has since been overruled, it is in a better position to revisit the reassignment clause 
and rule in favor of noncompetitive reassignments. See Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483–84; EEOC v. 
Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by United Airlines, Inc., 
693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012). Admittedly, a U.S. Supreme Court decision could definitively end 
the circuit split and avoid the process of incremental change through the lower courts. See Hutto v. 
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (asserting that U.S. Supreme Court precedent must be followed 
by lower court judges even if they disagree with the precedent). Moreover, the Court could further 
clarify the scope of its holding in U.S. Airways and the framework that lower courts should apply 
when analyzing a reassignment case. Compare Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483–84 (relying on U.S. Air-
ways to hold that disabled employees must compete with nondisabled employees for vacant posi-
tions), with United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 761 (relying on U.S. Airways to support noncompetitive 
reassignments). As the denial of certiorari in United Airlines indicates, however, it is unlikely that the 
Court will resolve the circuit split in the near future. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2734 (2013) (denying certiorari). 
 217 See United Airlines, 693 F.3d, at 761 (holding that, in light of U.S. Airways, “the ADA 
does indeed mandate that an employer appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for 
which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and 
would not present an undue hardship to that employer”). 
 218 See, e.g., Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
accommodating disabled employees does not require employers to infringe upon nondisabled 
employees’ rights under a collective bargaining agreement or other non-discriminatory policies); 
Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1020 (noting that in most cases an employer does not need to reassign disa-
bled employees if the reassignments would contravene a legitimate, non-discriminatory policy 
established by the employer); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 
1998) (indicating that employers are not required to reassign disabled employees if the reassign-
ment would breach a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy established by the employer). Although 
the courts have universally refused to condone violating the nondiscriminatory policies of an em-
ployer, the U.S. Supreme Court has warned that a bright line rule prohibiting the violation of these 
policies as a reasonable accommodation is unwarranted. See U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 406 (assert-
ing that it could be possible for the plaintiff to provide evidence justifying a departure from the 
rules of an established seniority system). 
 219 See U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 403; see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, 
at *3 (explaining that an accommodation is “reasonable on its face” or “in the run of cases” if it is 
“‘feasible’ or ‘plausible’”). 
 220 See U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 403; see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 74, 
at *23 (explaining that it will generally be unreasonable to reassign a disabled employee if doing 
so would violate the rules of a seniority system). 
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To avoid a similar fate, therefore, lower federal courts should hold that 
best-qualified reassignment policies are not similar to seniority systems and 
therefore do not qualify as legitimate non-discriminatory policies.221 The 
courts could reason that best-qualified reassignment policies are too subjec-
tive to be considered legitimate non-discriminatory policies.222 Unlike senior-
ity systems, which are highly transparent and objective, the flexibility of best-
qualified reassignment policies makes it relatively easy to discriminate 
against disabled employees.223 It would be difficult for courts to determine if 
a best-qualified reassignment policy was truly non-discriminatory.224 In sum, 
if best-qualified reassignment policies do not contain objective criteria, courts 
have more freedom to hold that reassigning disabled employees in violation 
of an existing best-qualified reassignment policy is reasonable.225 
CONCLUSION 
The ADA requires employers to provide disabled employees with rea-
sonable accommodations, including reassignments. By holding that the ADA 
does not grant disabled employees any limited preferential treatment, howev-
                                                                                                                           
 221 See United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764 (recognizing that a best-qualified reassignment policy 
is not the equivalent of a seniority policy). 
 222 See Befort, supra note 13, at 981 (arguing that most seniority systems are administered 
objectively and create legally enforceable claims to vacant positions where most assignment poli-
cies do not create legally enforceable claims to vacant positions). Employees frequently come to 
rely on the outcomes of seniority systems when planning their careers because objective criteria, 
such as length of service, produce predictable outcomes. See U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 404 (ac-
knowledging that seniority systems create an expectation of equal treatment); Midland Brake 180 
F.3d at 1176 (observing that well-established seniority systems can give senior employees legiti-
mate expectations). Best-qualified reassignment polices, however, do not create expectations in 
employees because determining who is best-qualified is an inherently unpredictable task involving 
subjective judgments. See Brief of Appellee Pam Huber at 15, Huber II, 486 F.3d 480 (No. 06-
2238), 2006 WL 5126387, at *15 (arguing that employees do not rely upon an employer’s “sub-
jective determination of qualification” in the same way they rely upon the “arithmetic certainties 
of seniority”). 
 223 See Perfetti v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 950 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 1991) (recognizing 
“the ease with which employers may use subjective factors to camouflage discrimination”) (inter-
nal quotations omitted); Jared Hager, Note, Bowling for Certainty: Picking Up the Seven-Ten Split 
by Pinning Down the Reasonableness of Reassignment After Barnett, 87 MINN. L. REV. 2063, 
2098–99 (2003) (observing that although it is relatively easy to compare the length of employment 
of different applicants, it is more difficult to compare the overall qualifications of different appli-
cants). 
 224 Aka, 156 F.3d at 1298 (stating that “courts traditionally treat explanations that rely heavily 
on subjective considerations with caution” because “an employer’s asserted strong reliance on 
subjective feelings about the candidates may mask discrimination”). 
 225 See id. Admittedly, however, implementing noncompetitive reassignments through the U.S. 
Airways framework would be less than ideal because it requires each U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to 
take action, which may be unlikely in some circuits. See Huber II, 486 F.3d at 483; Hedrick, 355 
F.3d at 459; Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d at 355; Terrell, 132 F.3d at 627; Wernick, 91 F.3d at 384–
85; Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700. 
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er, a majority of the U.S. Courts of Appeals have made it difficult for disabled 
employees to rely upon the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement. 
Forcing disabled employees to compete with nondisabled employees for va-
cant positions renders the Act’s reassignment clause meaningless. The ADA’s 
text, legislative history, and the EEOC enforcement guidance implementing 
the ADA all indicate that disabled employees are entitled to automatic reas-
signments instead of the mere opportunity to compete for reassignments.  
The best solution would be to amend the language of the ADA itself. 
This option is both feasible and would provide a definitive end to the circuit 
split. In the meantime, however, lower courts should apply the U.S. Airways 
framework to hold that best-qualified reassignment policies, unlike seniority 
systems, are not legitimate nondiscriminatory policies. Through either of 
these solutions, noncompetitive reassignments will help many disabled Amer-
icans keep their jobs and put the ADA back to work. 
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